The Clausewitzian War

• Much of On War is of interest only to military historians, dealing as it does with detailed questions of tactics and logistics that would become out of date after Clausewitz’ death.

Characterizing War §

• War is a clash of wills. War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. War is nothing but the continuation of policy with the admixture of other means.

  • There are two ends for war — to negotiate peace or to destroy the enemy.
  • As an artform, war employs the available means Mittel to a desired end Zweck. In intermediate stages, the commander may wish to achieve subgoals, Ziele, but all of these build towards the main objective of war.

• The moral strength of the troops requires they be brave, adaptable, have high stamina, and high enthusiasm. Soldiers must think of themselves as part of the army. Such can only be built through experience, and not through drills and regulation alone.

  • The purpose of the troops is to fight. Every logistical and maintenance operation in war (recruitment, sheltering, feeding the army) serves to make the troops able to fight.

• War is a trinity:

  • The people — who impart a primordial violence, hatred and enmity regarded as a blind, natural force.
  • The commander and his army — who play with chance and probability
  • The government — who imposes subordination as an instrument of policy which makes it subject to reason alone.

• The culture and the prevailing zeitgeist defines the limits of war. War does not occur in isolation, it occurs as part of a culture system

  • In an ideal case, there is no limit to the extremes that can arise from war, as both parties try to one-up each other. ¹
  • In reality, such restrictions exist because war does not exist in a closed system.
  • Nonetheless, circumstances in war drive us towards the ideal war. A strategist should always bear in mind the possibility of absolute war.

Waging War §

• To Clausewitz, war was a creative activity.

  • Military manoeuvre was pointless unless it was designed to culminate in battle
  • Battle was pointless unless it was designed to serve the ultimate purpose of the war — the ultimate purpose of war is political
  • Real War is different from a Theoretical war. A “scientific” approach to strategy and tactics is limited by the uncertainty of war. Murphy’s law applies. Thus, Clausewitz proposes a more pragmatic approach to the study of war.
    • Variables that introduce uncertainty are termed as Friction
    • Learning from the past serves two purposes — analysis of past events, and meta-analysis on the validity of the recorded history.
    • Theory can only exist as an aid, but in practice, the commander must find their own solutions through their own discernment
  • The real weapon of war is not physical but moral. It is reliant on the morale of the army.

• The moral strength of the commander is reliant on two things — discernment in the face of uncertainty, and determination in the face of doubt. The commander is the one who gives direction to the whole

  • The successful commander is not the one who knew the rules of war, but made the rules

• War builds up from the small scale to the larger scale — small engagements in war affect the larger strategy.

  • Tactics concerns itself with engagements.
  • Engagements concern themselves with the destruction of the enemy but also establishing superiority so that there is a threat of destruction for the enemy — especially if the destruction reduces the enemy’s ability to fight.
  • Strategy concerns itself with using tactics to achieve the ends of war.
  • Politics influences strategy.
  • The best strategy is to appear very strong — first in general, and then at the decisive point — which is to say, either be strong by having a numerical advantage or be strong through the commander’s own tactical skills.

• The best way to begin is through die Schlacht (the slaughter) — a single, concentrated, large scale operation. It was not a means to an end, but an end in and of itself.

  • The Schlacht was a decisive factor in warfare.
  • It is at this point where we show no mercy to the enemy, lest they show no mercy to us.

• Uncertainty also implies that more often than not, most of war is spent doing nothing. ²

• Being on the attack implies the attacker is stronger (or is desperate)

  • It is much easier to be the defender.
  • But defense in itself cannot be passive — defense consisted of:

    • Waiting for a blow

    • Parrying the blow (a counterattack)

      The aggressor is always peace-loving. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. It is the weak, those most likely to need defence, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed.

Topics §

• Book I - On the Nature of War

Links §

• On War by Clausewitz
• The Art of War - another related book.
• Clausewitz — A Very Short Introduction by Howard

Footnotes §

1. In the end, we are in an era where it is possible to perform total war — a single decisive blow delivered by a nuclear weapon at the center of gravity of the nation — its populace. ↩

2. Poisson distribution applies. ↩